-cost firm under incomplete information: a separating auction implies adverse selection and relies substantially on commitment to … allocation and transfer rules. A pooling auction serves as a commitment device against ex-post opportunistic behavior and … alleviates adverse selection. It can earn the investor a higher expected payoff than a separating auction, even when consistency …

’ bid. Equilibrium behavior in the first-price auction is mostly unaffected but there are multiple equilibria in the second …- price auction. Consequently, comparative statics across price rules are equivocal. Experimentally, leaks in the first- price … auction favor second movers but harm first movers and sellers, as theoretically predicted. Low to medium leak probabilities …

paper studies a model where firms precommit to capacity levels before competing in a uniform price auction. The analysis … equilibrium, the inefficient firm obtains a relatively large market share. -- spot market ; capacity game ; auction mechanism …

of a multi-object auction. After the auction either all bids or only the prices to be paid are revealed to all firms … bidders' costs generally depends on the type and fierceness of the market competition, the specific auction format, and the …

-price auction. Before the contest, a fixed number of innovators is selected in an entry auction, in order to address the adverse …

-price dimensions after the auction. Both auctions theoretically implement the surplus maximizing mechanism. Our experiment confirms …

allocation rules (first- vs. second-price - auction vs. fair division game). The data analysis of the sealed-bid, private value …

allocation rules (first- vs. second-price - auction vs. fair division game). The data analysis of the sealed-bid, private value …

auction works as predicted. In each treatment, the seller's actual revenue is significantly higher than the equilibrium …