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Collusion and delegation under information control

Asseyer, Andreas - 2020

This paper studies how information control affects incentives for collusion and optimal organizational structures in principal-supervisor-agent relationships. I consider a model in which the principal designs the supervisor's signal on the productive agent's private information and the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012160310

Collusion and delegation under information control

Asseyer, Andreas - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 15 (2020) 4, pp. 1547-1586

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012415488

Information transmission in nested sender-receiver games

Chen, Ying; Gordon, Sidartha - In: Economic theory : official journal of the Society for … 58 (2015) 3, pp. 543-569

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011374036

Control aversion in hierarchies

De Chiara, Alessandro; Engl, Florian; Herz, Holger; … - 2022

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013252792

Control aversion in hierarchies

De Chiara, Alessandro; Engl, Florian; Herz, Holger; … - 2022

Companies typically control various aspects of their workers' behaviors. In this paper, we investigate whether the hierarchical distance of the superior who imposes such control measures matters for the workers' ensuing reaction. In particular, we test, in a laboratory experiment, whether...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013255629

Delegation and nonmonetary incentives ; [1]

Ambrus, Attila; Egorov, Georgij V. - 2015

-employee relationship. We study a model of delegation with an informed agent, where the principal may impose money-burning on the agent as a … some results novel to the delegation literature. First, money-burning is more likely if the principal is more sensitive to …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011524157

Empowerment and the dark side of delegation

Kräkel, Matthias - 2018

The existing delegation literature has focused on different preferences of principal and agent concerning project … selection, which makes delegating authority costly for the principal. This paper shows that delegation has a cost even when the … without task commitment and other behavioral effects the principal might forgo delegation though being efficient. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011795221

Countervailing conflicts of interest in delegation games

Chiba, Saori; Leong, Kaiwen - In: Games 14 (2023) 6, pp. 1-20

In this paper, we investigate optimal delegation mechanisms in the presence of countervailing conflicts of interest in … to the outside option and project biases. We compare three delegation mechanisms: full delegation, veto-based delegation …, and communication (no delegation). Contrary to conventional one-dimensional conflict models, our findings reveal a non …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014443303

Private monitoring, collusion and the timing of information

Khalil, Fahad; Lawarrée, Jacques; Scott, Troy J. - 2013

When the information used by a principal to monitor an agent is private, and thus non-verifiable by a third party, the principal has a credibility issue with the agent. The agent should be concerned that the principal could misrepresent the information in order to collect a monetary penalty from...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010212662

A dynamic theory of regulatory capture

De Chiara, Alessandro; Schwarz, Marco - 2021

Firms often try to influence individuals that, like regulators, are tasked with advising or deciding on behalf of a third party. In a dynamic regulatory setting, we show that a firm may prefer to capture regulators through the promise of a lucrative future job opportunity (i.e., the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012491609