The “collective action problem†describes situations where each person in a group can individually profit more by withholding contributions to group goals. However, if all act in their material self-interest no public good is produced and all are worse off. I present a new solution to...

Introduction to Strategic Form Games -- Dominance -- Rationalizability -- Nash Equilibrium -- Perfect Equilibrium -- Evolutionary Stable Strategies -- Correlated Equilibrium -- Bayesian Nash Equilibrium -- Introduction to Extensive Form Games -- Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium -- Sequential...

This essay offers an exposition of the potential uses of game theoretic reasoning and mathematical models in the study of the prevention of nuclear war.

This paper experimentally explores how the enforcement of cooperative behavior in a social dilemma is facilitated through institutional as well as emotional mechanisms. Recent studies emphasize the importance of negatively valued emotions, such as anger, which motivate individuals to punish free...