Showing 1 - 10 of 22
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013219341
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013222524
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014426100
A choice behavior is rational if it is made in accordance with the maximization of some context-independent preference relation. This paper re-examines the classical questions of implementation theory under complete information in a setting in which players' choices need not be rational and in...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012827760
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012405426
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012433571
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012616778
A social choice correspondence (SCC) F is implementable in rationalizable strategies provided that there exists a mechanism such that for each state θ, the support of its set of rationalizable outcomes is equal to the socially desirable set F(θ). We find that r -monotonicity is a necessary...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012868342
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012405285
Interim Rationalizable Monotonicity, due to Oury and Tercieux (2012), fully characterizes the class of social choice functions that are implementable in interim correlated rationalizable (and Bayes-Nash equilibrium) strategies
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013288871