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The Coleman-Shapley-index : being decisive within the coalition of the interested

Casajus, André; Hüttner, Frank - 2018

The Coleman Power of the Collectivity to Act (CPCA) is a popular statistic that reflects the ability of a committee to pass a proposal. Applying the Shapley value to this measure, we derive a new power index that indicates each voter's contribution to the CPCA. This index is characterized by...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011844627

Lampe, Martin von; Deconinck, Koen; Bastien, Véronique - 2016

This report provides a conceptual foundation for the analysis of international regulatory co-operation (IRC) and its potential benefits through reduced trade costs. Different forms of IRC aiming to reduce specification, conformity assessment and information costs - which can arise from...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011582094

A cooperative value for Bayesian games

Kalai, Adam Taumann; Kalai, Ehud - 2010

Selfish, strategic players may benefit from cooperation, provided they reach agreement. It is therefore important to construct mechanisms that facilitate such cooperation, especially in the case of asymmetric private information. The two major issues are: (1) singling out a fair and efficient...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008665710

The Bonacich Shapley centrality

Allouch, Nizar; Meca, Ana; Polotskaya, K. - 2021

In this paper, we develop a new game theoretic network centrality measure based on the Shapley value. To do so, we consider a coalitional game, where the worth of each coalition is the total play in the game introduced in Ballester et al. (2006). We first establish that the game is convex. As a...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012584076

An experiment on the winter demand commitment bargaining mechanism

Chessa, Michela; Hanaki, Nobuyuki; Lardon, Aymeric; … - 2021

-period implementation, a twoperiod implementation with low and with high delay costs. Despite the different theoretical predictions, our … bargaining implementation with only one period is often sufficient in providing allocations that sustain the Shapley value as …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012695303

On non-cooperative foundation and implementation of the Nash solution in subgame perfect equilibrium via Rubinstein's game

Duman, Papatya; Trockel, Walter - 2016

interpreted as a mechanism theoretical implementation of the Nash solution. Our results in the present paper provide exact non … of the above mentioned support results, including our present ones, with mechanism theoretic implementation in (weakly … implementation can hardly be found except in very rare cases of extremely restricted domains of players' preferences. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011412680

Sixty-seven years of the Nash program : time for retirement?

Serrano, Roberto - In: SERIEs : Journal of the Spanish Economic Association 12 (2021) 1, pp. 35-48

The Nash program is an important research agenda initiated in Nash (Econometrica 21:128-140, 1953) in order to bridge the gap between the noncooperative and cooperative counterparts of game theory. The program is thus turning sixty-seven years old, but I will argue it is not ready for...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012503895

Rational bargaining in games with coalitional externalities

Borm, Peter; Ju, Yuan; Wettstein, David - In: Journal of economic theory 157 (2015), pp. 236-254

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011525259

Transfers and exchange-stability in two-sided matching problems

Lazarova, Emiliya A.; Borm, Peter; Estévez-Fernández, … - 2014

In this paper we consider one-to-many matching problems where the preferences of the agents involved are represented by monetary reward functions. We characterize Pareto optimal matchings by means of contractually exchange stability and matchings of maximum total reward by means of compensation...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010373726

Marginality, Dividends, and the Value in Games with Externalities

Hüttner, Frank - 2019

In the absence of externalities, marginality is equivalent to an independence property that rests on Harsanyi‘s dividends. These dividends identify the surplus inherent to each coalition. Independence states that a player‘s payoff stays the same if only dividends of coalitions to which this...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012869572