We study games with almost perfect information and an infinite time horizon. In such games, at each stage, the players simultaneously choose actions from finite action sets, knowing the actions chosen at all previous stages. The payoff of each player is a function of all actions chosen during...

For an increasing upper order hemi-continuous correspondence F selfmapping sigma-complete lattice A, we first provide tight fixed-point bounds for sufficiently large iterations on F starting from any initial point a in A. We use this result for conducting iterative fixed-point comparative...

This article presents a new approach to analyze the equilibrium set of symmetric, differentiable games by separating multiple symmetric equilibria and asymmetric equilibria. This separation allows the investigation of, for example, how various parameter constellations affect the scope for...

This paper studies the existence of a pure strategy Nash equilibrium in games with strategic complementarities where the strategy sets are totally ordered. By relaxing the conventional conditions related to upper semicontinuity and single crossing, we enlarge the class of games to which monotone...

This paper studies an economy whose agents perceive their consumption possibilities subjectively, and whose preferences are defined on what they subjectively experience, rather than on those alternatives that are objectively present. The model of agents' perceptions is based on intuitionistic...

We study the equilibrium existence problem in normal form and qualitative games in which it is possible to associate with each nonequilibrium point an open neighborhood and a collection of deviation strategies such that, at any nonequilibrium point of the neighborhood, a player can increase her...

In this paper we study an extension of the linear production game (LPG) introduced by Owen (1975). We discuss LPG with players who have flexible resources. Here, flexibility means that a player has a universal resource (e.g. working time) which he can split up (e.g. to execute different tasks)....

We study equilibrium existence in normal form games in which it is possible to associate with each nonequilibrium point an open neighborhood, a set of players, and a collection of deviation strategies such that, at any nonequilibrium point of the neighborhood, a player from the set can increase...

Embarking from the concept of uniform payoff security (Journal of Econonomic Theory, Vol. 134, 2007), we introduce two other uniform conditions and then study the existence of mixed strategy Nash equilibria in games where the sum of the payoff functions is not necessarily upper semicontinuous