We address the following question: When can one person properly be said to be more delay averse than another? In reply, several (nested) comparison methods are developed. These methods yield a theory of delay aversion which parallels that of risk aversion. The applied strength of this theory is...

This paper formulates the classic Monty Hall problem as a Bayesian game. Allowing Monty a small amount of freedom in his decisions facilitates a variety of solutions. The solution concept used is the Bayes Nash Equilibrium (BNE), and the set of BNE relies on Monty’s motives and incentives. We...

Stochastic independence (SI) has a complex status in probability theory. It is not part of the definition of a probability measure, but it is nonetheless an essential property for the mathematical development of this theory, hence a property that any theory on the foundations of probability...

We consider a market economy where two rational agents are able to learn the distribution of future events. In this context, we study whether moving away from the standard Bayesian belief updating, in the sense of under-reaction to some degree to new information, may be strategically convenient...

To incentivize workers and boost performance, firms often offer monetary bonuses for the achievement of production goals. Such bonuses appeal to two types of motivations of the worker. On the one hand, the existence of a goal, on its own, triggers an intrinsic motivation associated with the...

Absent the introduction of either of `social conventions', or `negotiations over socially acceptable behaviors', this study arrives at a formal theoretical general equilibrium parameterization of morality. Suppose all socioeconomic agents are boundedly rational and seek to act rationally. Under...

We embed time inconsistent agents (players) in non-cooperative games. To solve such games, we introduce two solution concepts, which we refer to as equilibrium and naive backwards induction. When all players are sophisticated time inconsistent, these solution concepts are equivalent and coincide...

In this paper, we study intertemporal social welfare evaluations when agents may have heterogeneous time preferences. We first show that, even if all agents share the time preference, there exists a conflict between efficiency in the sense of Pareto principle, time consistency, and equity...

In this paper I propose a time-consistent method of discounting hyperbolically and apply it to three canonical environmental problems: (i) optimal renewable resource use, (ii) the tragedy of the commons, (iii) economic growth and pollution. I then compare results with those for conventional...

In this paper I propose a time-consistent method of discounting hyperbolically that contains the discount rate implied by Gamma discounting as a special case. I apply the discounting method to three canonical environmental problems: (i) optimal renewable resource use, (ii) the tragedy of the...