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Choi, Jay Pil; Thum, Marcel - 2003

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001786457

Choi, Jay Pil; Thum, Marcel - 2003

This paper provides a simple model of repeated extortion. In particular, we ask whether corrupt government officials' ex post opportunism to demand more once entrepreneurs have made sunk investments entails further distortion in resource allocations. We show that the inability of government...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010507749

Crime, credible enforcement, and multiple equilibria

Baker, Matthew J.; Miceli, Thomas J. - In: International review of law and economics 68 (2021), pp. 1-8

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013282600

Is the severity of the penalty an effective deterrent? : a strategic approach for the crime of tax evasion

Chiarini, Bruno; Marzano, Elisabetta - 2016

can be tricky, this paper uses the crime strategic model (inspection game) proposed by Tsebelis. This model shows that any … attempts to increase the severity of punishment will alter the payoff of the individuals involved, leaving unchanged the … frequency of violation at equilibrium. This result is misleading: payoffs are not independent and the crime game can not be …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011544186

Transnational policing : preemption and deterrence against elusive perpetrators

Nakao, Keisuke - In: Defence and peace economics 30 (2019) 3, pp. 349-366

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012200539

Leniency can increase deterrence

Lundberg, Alexander - In: International review of law and economics 60 (2019), pp. 1-5

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012298248

The Economics of Repeated Extortion

Choi, Jay Pil; Thum, Marcel P. - 1999

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014204976

The deterrence effects of gun laws in games with asymmetric skills and information

Oliveira, Cristiano; Balbinotto Neto, Giácomo - In: Review of law and economics : publ. in cooperation with … 11 (2015) 3, pp. 435-452

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011381813

Endogenous detection of collaborative crime : the case of corruption

Spengler, Dominic - In: Review of law and economics : publ. in cooperation with … 10 (2014) 2, pp. 201-217

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010384315

The impact of fine size and uncertainty on punishment and deterrence : theory and evidence from the laboratory

Feess, Eberhard; Schildberg-Hörisch, Hannah; Schramm, … - 2015

of fines on punishment and deterrence. Partial effects are effects on potential violators' and punishers' decisions when … punish, which in turn reduces the deterrence effect of high fines. Using a laboratory experiment, we identify these effects … hypotheses derived from the theory. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011347317