An auction is externality-robust if unilateral deviations from equilibrium leave the other bidders' payoffs unaffected … externalities due to spiteful preferences, which have been used to explain overbidding in the second-price auction (SPA). Another … example are cross-shareholdings between companies that compete in an auction. We derive an auction that coincides with the SPA …

externality-robust implementation. In particular, we derive the externality-robust counterpart of the second-price auction. Our … experiments replicate the earlier finding of overbidding in the second-price auction, but we find that average bids equal value in … the externality-robust auction. Our data also reveal that both auctions produce the same level of efficiency, suggesting …

externality-robust implementation. In particular, we derive the externality-robust counterpart of the second-price auction. Our … experiments replicate the earlier finding of overbidding in the second-price auction, but we find that average bids equal value in … the externality-robust auction. Our data also reveal that both auctions produce the same level of efficiency, suggesting …

hypothetical events - like winning an auction. This paper investigates experimentally whether bidders in a common value auction …

hypothetical events - like winning an auction. This paper investigates experimentally whether bidders in a common value auction …

, deals with bidders' anticipated regrets from winning and from losing the auction. It exploits the stochastic properties of … the auction format and rationalizes: (i) Nash equilibrium bidding, (ii) (non-)monotone overbidding and (iii) fully cursed …

’ bid. Equilibrium behavior in the first-price auction is mostly unaffected but there are multiple equilibria in the second …- price auction. Consequently, comparative statics across price rules are equivocal. Experimentally, leaks in the first- price … auction favor second movers but harm first movers and sellers, as theoretically predicted. Low to medium leak probabilities …

-frequency trading. We explain how IEX differs from traditional continuous double auction markets and present summary data on IEX … of the continuous double auction. The model predicts that IEX will generally improve price efficiency and lower …

-price dimensions after the auction. Both auctions theoretically implement the surplus maximizing mechanism. Our experiment confirms …