A generalization of transferable utility cooperative games from the functional forms introduced by von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944, Theory of Games and Economic Behavior) and Lucas and Thrall (1963, Naval Research Logistics Quarterly, 10, 281-298) is proposed to allow for multiple membership....

We consider an environment where players are involved in a public goods game and must decide repeatedly whether to make an individual contribution or not. However, players lack strategically relevant information about the game and about the other players in the population. The resulting behavior...

Analyzing data from a laboratory experiment on coordination games, we tested competing models of deviations from myopic best-reply dynamics to understand 'what kind of noise' is supported by behavioral evidence. This empirical analysis complements a growing theoretical literature on 'how noise...

We test whether the decisions in a common-pool resource game are better modeled game-theoretically as strategic substitutes or complements using an individual-level dataset of groundwater usage that accounts for 3% of US irrigated agriculture. We find support for strategic complements,...

We test whether the decisions in a common-pool resource game are better modeled game- theoretically as strategic substitutes or complements using an individual-level dataset of groundwater usage that accounts for 3% of US irrigated agriculture. Based on a regression framework with instrumental...

We investigate the strategic nature of farmers' groundwater usage with a rich dataset from the American Midwest. We propose a new revealed preference test for the groundwater interaction as a dynamic game. We reject a view of groundwater usage decisions as strategic substitutes in favor of...