We introduce a simple game-theoretical model that captures the main aspects of the repeated interaction between an issuer and a credit-rating agency. It involves up-front payments of issuer-fees and direct publication of requested ratings. Due to pecuniary injuries for untruthful ratings, the...

We introduce a simple game-theoretical model that captures the main aspects of the repeated interaction between an issuer and a credit-rating agency. It involves up-front payments of issuer-fees and direct publication of requested ratings. Due to pecuniary injuries for untruthful ratings, the...

This dissertation consists of five essays contributing to a better understanding of three fundamental lines of research in behavioral economics: trust and cooperation in social interactions, gender discrimination, and decision making under risk and uncertainty. All essays are novel contributions...

This dissertation extends the understanding of asymmetric group behavior in the provision of public goods. Previous studies, using an asymmetric framework, have so far focused on situations where all players profit form the social optimum. The discussion in the first paper breaks with this...

Background: Physicians' financial interests might conflict with the best service to patients. It is essential to gain a thorough understanding of the effect of remuneration systems on physician behaviour. Methods: We conducted a controlled laboratory experiment using a within-subject design to...