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Social decision rules are not immune to conflict

Esteban Marquillas, Joan María; Ray, Debraj - In: Economics of governance 2 (2001) 1, pp. 59-67

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001562050

Social decision rules are not immune to conflict

Esteban Marquillas, Joan María; Ray, Debraj - 1999

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001409459

Social decision rules are not immune to conflict

Esteban Marquillas, Joan María; Ray, Debraj - In: Conflict and governance, (pp. 193-201). 2003

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001800231

Internally renegotiation-proof equilibrium sets : limit behavior with low discounting

Ray, Debraj - In: Games and economic behavior 6 (1994) 1, pp. 162-177

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001167607

A game-theoretic perspective on coalition formation

Ray, Debraj - 2007 - 1. publ.

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003373727

A game-theoretic perspective on coalition formation

Ray, Debraj - 2007

The formation of coalitions to achieve both collaborative and competitive goals is a phenomenon we see all around us. The list of examples of this phenomenon is long and varied: production cartels, political lobbies, customs unions, environmental coalitions, and ethnic alliances are just a few...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015204076