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other hand the decision makers rely too much on the received information. Moreover, communication as well as payoffs … communication is less biased. In all treatments, however, the messages are more precise than theoretically predicted. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010260085
We study communication in a static Cournot duopoly model under the assumption that the firms have unverifiable private … can communicate through a third party, communication can be informative even when it is not substantiated by any … commitment or costly actions. We exhibit a simple mechanism that ensures informative communication and interim Pareto dominates …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009633349
informed senders. Private information is (conditionally) correlated across players, and communication is cheap talk. For the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010189326
In the past, many refinements have been proposed to select equilibria in cheap talk games. Usually, these refinements were motivated by a discussion of how rational agents would reason in some particular cheap talk games. In this paper, we propose a new refinement and stability measure that is...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010477113
We theoretically and experimentally analyze the role of verifiability and privacy in strategic performance feedback using a “one principal-two agent” context with real effort. We confirm the theoretical prediction that information transmission occurs only in verifiable feedbackmechanisms and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011389425
We design experimental games to evaluate the predictive power of the first cheap‐talk refinement, neologism‐proofness. In our first set of treatments designed to evaluate the refinement with its usual emphasis on literal meanings, we find that a fully revealing equilibrium that is...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011994751
informed senders. Private information is (conditionally) correlated across players, and communication is cheap talk. For the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011774610
We examine multistage information transmission with voluntary monetary transfer in the framework of Crawford and Sobel (1982). In our model, an informed expert can send messages to an uninformed decision maker more than once, and the uninformed decision maker can pay money to the informed expert...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011671657
) equilibrium. Fully informative myopic and farsighted equilibria essentially take a particular simple form: all communication is … and analyze equilibrium welfare. Furthermore, we extend our model to public communication and investigate the implications …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012020319
We investigate strategic information transmission with communication error, or noise. Our main finding is that adding … it possible to achieve the best payoff that can be obtained by means of any communication device. As in the model without …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011702289