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Möller, Markus - 2024

I study a central authority's ability to commit to a publicly announced mechanism in a one-to-one agent-object matching … model. The authority announces a strategy-proof mechanism and then privately selects a mechanism to initiate a matching. An … agent's observation in form of the final matching has an innocent explanation (Akbarpour and Li, 2020), if given the agent …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014533360

A Theory of Simplicity in Games and Mechanism Design

Pycia, Marek; Troyan, Peter - 2021

We introduce a general class of simplicity standards that vary the foresight abilities required of agents in extensive-form games. Rather than planning for the entire future of a game, agents are presumed to be able to plan only for those histories they view as simple from their current...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013220157

Competing with Asking Prices

Lester, Benjamin - 2013

In many markets, sellers advertise their good with an asking price. This is a price at which the seller is willing to take his good off the market and trade immediately, though it is understood that a buyer can submit an offer below the asking price and that this offer may be accepted if the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013087203

Competing with Asking Prices

Lester, Benjamin - 2013

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013087422

Sequential bargaining with pure common values

Schweinzer, Paul - 2006

We study the alternating-offers bargaining problem of assigning an indivisible and commonly valued object to one of two players in return for some payment among players. The players are asymmetrically informed about the object's value and have veto power over any settlement. There is no...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010373492

Sequential bargaining with pure common values and incomplete information on both sides

Schweinzer, Paul - 2006

We study the alternating-offer bargaining problem of sharing a common value pie under incomplete information on both sides and no depreciation between two identical players. We characterise the essentially unique perfect Bayesian equilibrium of this game which turns out to be in gradually...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010373493

Contests for status

Moldovanu, Benny; Sela, Aner; Shi, Xianwen - 2005

We study the optimal design of organizations under the assumption that agents in a contest care about their relative position. A judicious definition of status categories can be used by a principal in order to influence the agents' performance. We first consider a pure status case where there...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010373503

Competing with Asking Prices

Lester, Benjamin - 2016

In many markets, sellers advertise their good with an asking price. This is a price at which the seller will take his good off the market and trade immediately, though it is understood that a buyer can submit an offer below the asking price and that this offer may be accepted if the seller...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012986936

Truth-Telling Dominating Strategy : Impossibilities of Shill-Proofness

Jeong, Seungwon (Eugene) - 2020

A strategy is truth-telling dominating (TTD) if it weakly (strictly, resp.) dominates truth-telling for all (some, resp.) strategy profiles of others. A strategy is iteratively TTD (i-TTD) if any iterate is TTD and payoff improving. We show that any mechanism only with undominated equilibria is...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012837267

Efficient Investments in the Implementation Problem

Tomoeda, Kentaro - 2019

This paper identifies a condition for an efficient social choice rule to be fully implementable when we take into account investment efficiency. To do so, we extend the standard implementation problem to include endogenous ex ante and ex post investments. In our problem, the social planner aims...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012865971