This paper dispels some suspicion on the validity of Hotelling's "Stability in Competition" conclusion. Sellers do move to the center of the beach, and if there are many sub-beaches, they move to the respective center. If there is a mountain between two beaches, they dig tunnel through it to...

We consider a Hotelling game where a finite number of retailers choose a location, given that their potential customers are distributed on a network. Retailers do not compete on price but only on location, therefore each consumer shops at the closest store. We show that when the number of...

This work studies the Hotelling game with sequential choice of prices, that is, the Stackelberg-Hotelling (SHOT) game. The game is studied through numerical simulation, which provides the subgame perfect equilibrium solution not only in the unrestricted game but also in the game with reservation...

Hotellings berühmtes "Prinzip der minimalen Differenzierung" behauptet, dass zwei Firmen, die sich miteinander in räumlichem Wettbewerb befinden, dieselbe Position wählen. Wenn man räumlichen Wettbewerb als Modellierung von Produktdifferenzierung versteht, bedeutet dieses, dass die Firmen...