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Stability of collusion and quality differentiation : a Nash bargaining approach

Athanasopoulos, Thanos; Dindaroglu, Burak; Petropoulos, … - 2021

parameter that determines firms' market strategies. We study collusion in a quality-differentiated duopoly and we adopt a Nash …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012655386

Assignment games with externalities and matching-based Cournot competition

Chen, Bo - 2013

We develop a model of assignment games with pairwise-identitydependent externalities. A concept of conjectural equilibrium is proposed, and the universal conjecture is shown to be the necessary and sufficient condition for the general existence of equilibrium. We then apply the solution concept...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010191642

Stability of Collusion and Quality Differentiation : A Nash Bargaining Approach

Athanasopoulos, Thanos; Dindaroglu, Burak; Petropoulos, … - 2021

an important parameter that determines firms' market strategies. We study collusion in a quality differentiated duopoly …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013251865

On the role of network externalities in strategic delegation contracts with an industry-wide union

Hou, Haiyang; Hong, Shihuang; Zhao, Chunyu - In: Applied economics letters 24 (2017) 21, pp. 1621-1628

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011853570

Biased Managers and Endogenous Delegation in Duopoly and Triopoly

Choi, Kangsik - 2021

We investigate the differentiated duopoly and triopoly markets in which firms can choose to strategically delegate when … under duopoly, one firm chooses delegate, while the other firm chooses not to delegate as multiple equilibria. However, in … equilibrium, our results imply that the underconfident (overconfident) manager in the duopoly (triopoly) is more likely to take …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013241508

Strategic corporate social responsibility

Planer-Friedrich, Lisa; Sahm, Marco - 2017

We examine the strategic use of Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) in imperfectly competitive markets. The level of CSR determines the weight a firm puts on consumer surplus in its objective function before it decides upon supply. First, we consider symmetric Cournot competition and show that...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011657756