We introduce a general class of simplicity concepts that vary the foresight abilities required of agents in extensive-form games, and use it to provide characterizations of simple mechanisms in social choice environments with and without transfers. We show that obvious strategy-proofness—an...

We introduce a general class of simplicity standards that vary the foresight abilities required of agents in extensive-form games. Rather than planning for the entire future of a game, agents are presumed to be able to plan only for those histories they view as simple from their current...

We introduce a general class of simplicity standards that vary the foresight abilities required of agents in extensive-form games. Rather than planning for the entire future of a game, agents are presumed to be able to plan only for those histories they view as simple from their current...

We propose a solution to the trade-off between Pareto efficiency and stability in matching markets. We define a matching to be essentially stable if any claim initiates a chain of reassignments that ultimately results in the initial claimant losing the object she claimed to a third agent. Our...