The Covid-19 pandemic has accelerated the trend of many colleges moving to test-optional, and in some cases test-blind, admissions policies. A frequent claim is that by not seeing standardized test scores, a college is able to admit a student body that it prefers, such as one with more...

This paper discusses the implications of strategic voting for institutional design in environments where the only role of elections is to aggregate information. We adopt a mechanism design perspective, which assumes that prior to a standard voting game, a fictitious designer has to select the...

Misrepresenting private information is often costly. This paper studies a model of strategic information transmission based on Crawford and Sobel (1982)(CS), but with a signaling dimension where there is a convex cost of misreporting. I identify a simple condition, called No Incentive to...

Austen-Smith and Banks (Journal of Economic Theory, 2000) study how money burning can expand the set of pure cheap talk equilibria of Crawford and Sobel (Econometrica, 1982). This note identifies an error in the main Theorem of Austen-Smith and Banks, and provides a variant that preserves some...