This paper studies experimentally the selection of strategies in a canonical dynamic environment, the dynamic common pool game. The main goal is to evaluate if behavior can be rationalized with strategies that condition on past play that can support efficient outcomes, or with stationary Markov...

This paper experimentally examines the selection of equilibria in dynamic games. Our baseline treatment is a two-state extension of an indefinitely repeated prisoner's dilemma, which we modify in series of treatments to study the focality of efficiency and symmetry, the effect dynamic and static...

We implement multi-sender cheap talk in the laboratory. While full-information transmission is not theoretically feasible in the standard one-sender-one- dimension model, in this setting with more senders and dimensions, full revelation is generically a robust equilibrium outcome. Our...

In dynamic environments where the strategic setting evolves across time, the specific rule governing the transitions can substantially alter the incentives agents face. This is particularly true when history‐dependent strategies are used. In a laboratory study, we examine whether subjects...