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majority coalition can be stable, provided that reciprocity is sufficiently strong and widespread. In addition, a stable … minority coalition can exist, even with weak reciprocity preferences. This latter coalition is weakly larger than the maximum … stable coalition with standard preferences, but is characterized by mutually negative sentiments. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010400178
on others' abatement. I show that a full or majority coalition can be stable. This requires, however, that a majority of … countries have relatively strong reciprocity preferences. No coalition participation is always stable. In addition, a stable … minority coalition may exist; if so, it is weakly larger than the maximum stable coalition with standard preferences, but is …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010488278
In this paper, we extend the Fehr and Schmidt model of inequality aversion to a situation where the players differ with respect to their benefits and costs from contributions to a non-linear public good. A necessary condition for contributing to the public good is that the players’ benefit...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009244226
In this paper, we extend the Fehr and Schmidt model of inequality aversion to a situation where the players differ with respect to their benefits and costs from contributions to a non-linear public good. A necessary condition for contributing to the public good is that the players’ benefit...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014178828
&S preferences. Stability of the grand coalition is never reached, but potential internally stable grand coalitions are achieved … eines globalen öffentlichen Gutes – z.B. Klimaschutz - eingeführt. Spieler tragen – wenn sie einer Koalition beitreten … higher levels of cooperation, prevents the formation of stable coalitions. The introduction of other–regarding preferences …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013493119
In this paper we analyze how ratification uncertainty impacts the optimal terms of international environmental agreements (IEAs). We relax the frequent assumption of countries as unitary actors by modeling the ratification stage through uncertain preferences of a ratifying agent (e.g. the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010339399
policy. To this end, we expand the modest coalition formation game, in which countries first decide on whether to join an … and emissions. We find that strategic delegation crowds out all efforts to increase coalition sizes by less ambitious …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012388125
policy. To this end, we expand the modest coalition formation game, in which countries first decide on whether to join an … and emissions. We find that strategic delegation crowds out all efforts to increase coalition sizes by less ambitious …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013326522
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012015706
We expand upon the previous models of inequity aversion of Fehr and Schmidt [1], and Frohlich et al. [2], which assume that dictators get disutility if the final allocation of surplus deviates from the equal split (egalitarian principle) or from the subjects' production (libertarian principle)....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009754116