We analyze the subgame-perfect equilibria of a game where two agents bargain in order to share the risk in their assets that will pay dividends once at some fixed date. The uncertainty about the size of the dividends is resolved gradually by the payment date and each agent has his own view about...

We design a laboratory experiment to identify whether a preference for randomization defines a stable type across different choice environments. In games and individual decisions, subjects face twenty simultaneous repetitions of the same choice. Subjects can randomize by making different choices...

Market entry situations are modelled, where an entrepreneur has to decide for a collection of markets which market to enter and which not. The entrepreneur can improve his prior information by making use of a group of informants, each of them knowing the situation in one or more markets. For...

An important goal of financial risk regulation is promoting coordination. Law's coordinating function minimizes costly conflict and encourages greater uniformity among market participants. Likewise, privately developed market standards, such as standard-form contracts and rules incorporated into...

We illustrate, by means of two examples, why assuming the principals offer simple menus (i.e. collections of payoff-relevant alternatives) as opposed to more general mechanisms may preclude a complete characterization of the set of equilibrium outcomes in certain sequential contracting...

This paper investigates the usefulness of non-choice data, namely response times, as a predictor of threshold behavior in a simple global game experiment. Our results indicate that the signal associated to the highest or second highest response time at the beginning of the experiment are both...