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We examine the role of cooperative preferences, beliefs, and punishments to uncover potential cross-societal differences in voluntary cooperation. Using one-shot public goods experiments in four comparable subject pools from the US and the UK (two similar Western societies) and Morocco and...
Persistent link: https://ebvufind01.dmz1.zbw.eu/10014338895
Persistent link: https://ebvufind01.dmz1.zbw.eu/10009516822
Previous experiments have found mixed results on whether honesty is intuitive or requires deliberation. Here we add to this literature by building on prior work of Capraro (2017). We report a large study (N=1,389) manipulating time pressure vs time delay in a deception game. We find that, in...
Persistent link: https://ebvufind01.dmz1.zbw.eu/10012899234
Persistent link: https://ebvufind01.dmz1.zbw.eu/10012240865
We examine the role of cooperative preferences, beliefs, and punishments to uncover potential cross-societal differences in voluntary cooperation. Using one-shot public goods experiments in four comparable subject pools from the US and the UK (two similar Western societies) and Morocco and...
Persistent link: https://ebvufind01.dmz1.zbw.eu/10014335871
Persistent link: https://ebvufind01.dmz1.zbw.eu/10014470038
This paper shows that the incentive effects of heterogeneity may be positive rather than negative in dynamic contests with multiple stages. In particular, the well-studied adverse effects of heterogeneity in static interactions are compensated by positive continuation-value and selection...
Persistent link: https://ebvufind01.dmz1.zbw.eu/10013049077
Persistent link: https://ebvufind01.dmz1.zbw.eu/10014427749
This paper investigates whether a designer can improve both the incentive provision and the selection performance of a promotion contest by making the competition more (or less) dynamic. A comparison of static (one-stage) and dynamic (two-stage) contests reveals that this is not the case. A...
Persistent link: https://ebvufind01.dmz1.zbw.eu/10010260055
This paper investigates the implications of different prize structures on effort provision in dynamic (two-stage) elimination contests. Theoretical results show that, for risk-neutral participants, a structure with a single prize for the winner of the contest maximizes total effort, while a...
Persistent link: https://ebvufind01.dmz1.zbw.eu/10010260060