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Veto players and policy trade-offs : an intertemporal approach to study the effects of political institutions on policy

Scartascini, Carlos G.; Tommasi, Mariano; Stein, Ernesto - 2010

are two desirable properties of policymaking systems. The veto player approach has suggested that polities with more veto …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010247136

Stable coalition structures in simple games with veto control

Çiftçi, Barış (contributor); Dimitrov, Dinko (contributor) - 2006

semi-value of a monotonic simple game with veto control. We consider partitions of the player set in which the winning …. Provided that the veto player set is not a winning coalition in a symmetric simple game, then the partition containing the …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003731222

Strategic Alliances in a Veto Game : An Experimental Study

Kim, Chulyoung; Kim, Sang-Hyun; Lee, Jinhyuk; Lee, Joosung - 2021

In a veto game, we investigate the effects of "buyout" which allows non-veto players strategically form an intermediate … much lower than predicted by theory, regardless of the relative negotiation power between veto and non-veto players. Second …, allowing coalition formation among non-veto players does not affect the surplus distribution between veto and non-veto players …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013243564

Stable Coalition Structures in Simple Games with Veto Control

Ciftci, Baris - 2007

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012731355

Political Compromise and Endogenous Formation of Coalitions

Gerber, Anke; Ortuño-Ortín, Ignacio - 2008

A one-dimensional model of spatial political competition with endogenous party formation is developed. It is proved that at equilibrium there are only two parties. These parties propose alternatives in the extreme positions of the policy space. The adopted policy, however, is a compromise...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014221617

Dynamic Collective Choice with Endogenous Status Quo

Dziuda, Wioletta; Loeper, Antoine - 2015

This paper analyzes an ongoing bargaining situation in which preferences evolve over time and the previous agreement becomes the next status quo, determining the payoffs until a new agreement is reached. We show that the endogeneity of the status quo induces perverse incentives that exacerbate...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014162072

Hiding Information in Electoral Competition

Heidhues, Paul; Lagerlöf, Johan - 2002

We model a two-candidate electoral competition in which there is uncertainty about a policy-relevant state of the world. The candidates receive private signals about the true state, which are imperfectly correlated. We study whether the candidates are able to credibly communicate their...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014114607

Capture by Threat

Dal Bo, Ernesto; Di Tella, Rafael - 2002

We analyze a simple stochastic environment where policymakers can be threatened by "nasty" interest groups. In the absence of these groups, the policymaker's desire for reelection guarantees that good policies are implemented for every realization of the shock. When pressure groups can harass...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014107151

Political Contestability and Contract Rigidity : An Analysis of Procurement Contracts

Beuve, Jean - 2016

We compare procurement contracts where the procurer is either a public agent or a private corporation. Using algorithmic data reading and textual analysis on a rich dataset of con- tracts for a standardized product and service from a single provider, we find that public contracts feature more...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013006106

The Logic of Two-Level Games with Endogenous Lobbying : Case of International Environmental Agreements

Haffoudhi, Houda - 2017

International environmental agreements (IEAs) are increasingly important in a globalized economy. The aim of our paper is study the effect of political pressure groups-lobbies- on the size and stability of IEAs. To this purpose we use the framework of two-level games to explain how national...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012964613