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The paper presents a game-theoretic model in order to investigate to what extent an employee privatization program of a State owned firm can be feasible under certain assumptions concerning the players' objective functions and the market structure in which the firm operates. The public managers...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014180719
This is the second part of a comprehensive essay on the Rawlsian view of CSR (corporate social responsibility) seen as a multistakehodler model of corporate governance. I describe the repeated game among the firms and its stakeholders so that several types of reputations, based on the full or...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014185260
This is the first part of a comprehensive essay on the Rawlsian view of corporate social responsibility (in short CSR). CSR is defined as a multi-stakeholder model of corporate governance and objective function based on the extension of fiduciary duties toward all the firm’s stakeholders. A...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014043906
We consider an entrepreneur that is the sole producer of a cost reducing skill, but the entrepreneur that hires a team to use the skill cannot prevent collusive trade for the innovation-related knowledge between employees and competitors. We show that there are two types of diffusion-avoiding...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014197952
We model a managerial decision environment in which a manager both determines the skill heterogeneity of her workers and determines whether to retain or delegate the ability to allocate tasks. The manager prefers delegating when uncertainty is sufficiently high relative to the incentive conflict...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012924939
We consider a firm A initially owning a software platform (e.g. operating system) and an application for this platform. The specific knowledge of another firm B is needed to make the platform successful by creating a further application. When B’s application is completed, A has incentives to...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003923366
A hierarchically structured rent-seeking contest may be associated with lower equilibrium expenditure than a corresponding flat contest. In this chapter we discuss how this fact may be used to explain the structure of organizations such as firms, including why firms commonly have outside owners.
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010359931
This paper provides a formal analysis on the investment coordination problem in a vertically separated electricity supply industry, although the analysis may apply also to other network industries. In an electric- ity system, the investment decisions of network and power plants need to be...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010421957
Team collaborations in which each member's output is critical to the overall success present organizations with difficult coordination problems. Despite the need for communication in such situations, team members often fail to share essential information. To examine why team communication and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013299407
The profitability of a firm is jointly determined by it's organizational structure and the market structure. To explore the effects of market factors on optimal organizational structure we develop a real-time information processing model of a multi unit firm in a dynamic duopoly environment. Our...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012719892