When agents with private information compete for resources from a principal and are biased towards their own favored projects (e.g., a CEO decides which division manager's project to fund) an agency problem arises. However, possible future interaction can mitigate this problem even without...

A game in which an incumbent and an entrant decide the timings of entries into a new market is investigated. The profit flows involve two uncertain factors: (1) the basic level of the demand of the market observed only by the incumbent and (2) the fluctuation of the profit flow described by a...

This paper discusses a selected literature on continuous-time option games models, providing new insights and extensions. The paper analyzes both symmetrical and asymmetrical duopoly under uncertainty, including issues like preemption, non-binding collusion, perfect-Nash equilibriums,...

We study risk-shifting behavior in a laboratory experiment, a setup that overcomes methodological hurdles faced by empiricists in the past. The participants are high-level managers. We observe risk shifting in a simple setup, but less in a setup with a continuation value. Reputation effects also...

Most applications of real options analysis assume a single decision-maker uses flexibility to maximize a firm's market value. This paper presents an alternative approach suitable for firms with two utility-maximizing decision-makers who have joint responsibility for setting firm policies. In...

The purpose of this study is to examine and demonstrate the strategic investment decisions faced by Taiwan's chain and franchise store enterprise. We show that incorporating an abandonment option to strategic timing in a game-theoretic real option approach makes the approach more complete and...

This monograph presents existing and new research on three approaches to multiagent incentives: simpler mechanisms, robust mechanisms, and implicit contracts. The goal of all three approaches is to find theories that better explain observed institutions than the standard approach has

The investment boundaries defined by Grenadier (2002) for an oligopoly investment game determine equilibria in open-loop strategies. As closed-loop strategies, they are not equilibria, because any firm by investing sooner can preempt the investments of other firms and expropriate the growth...

We explain essentially all known discounted utility anomalies as artefacts of the optimizing behavior of an individual with a time-separable utility function, who perceives a good as a source of a stochastic consumption stream, and believes that she can wait for an optimal moment to buy or sell...