Extensive evidence suggests that managers strategically choose the complexity of their descriptive disclosures. However, their motives in doing so appear mixed, as complex disclosures are used to obfuscate in some cases and as a means of informative communication in others. Building on these...

This paper studies strategic interactions between public and private enforcement of accounting regulation and their consequences for the deterrence of financial misreporting. We develop an economic model with a manager, a public enforcement agency, and an investor and derive equilibrium...

Information asymmetry has been a critical issue in management accounting. Non-co-linearity of interests among market participants brings forth this problem. As a decision making tool, firms should leverage out the benefits of management accounting system to encounter this problem, as it has a...

This paper studies an economy whose agents perceive their consumption possibilities subjectively, and whose preferences are defined on what they subjectively experience, rather than on those alternatives that are objectively present. The model of agents' perceptions is based on intuitionistic...

This article analyzes the role of information in building reputation in an investment/trust game. The model allows for information asymmetry in a finitely repeated sender-receiver game and solves for sequential equilibrium to show that if there are some trustworthy managers who always disclose...

'Prominence' plays an important role in financial reporting – an entity might assign an item to the footnotes, report it below the line, or comment on it in a press release versus the MD&A. We propose a model where quantitative disclosures are classified as more or less prominent, based on...

The aim of auditing is to protect active and potential investors from accounting fraud. However, the large number of auditing scandals demonstrates that auditing has a dark side. This dark side of auditing is the topic of this paper. Correct auditing is a public good, provided by private...

Incentives often distort behavior: they induce agents to exert effort but this effort is not employed optimally. This paper proposes a theory of incentive design allowing for such distorted behavior. At the heart of the theory is a trade-off between getting the agent to exert effort and ensuring...

We examine the implementation of efficient decisions about accepting a special order with asymmetric information by means of a dual transfer pricing mechanism based on Ronen and McKinney (1970). The model is designed in a simple fashion, two vertically related divisions within a firm...