In our framed laboratory experiment, two Public Officials, A and B, make consecutive decisions regarding embezzlement … Official A at almost all individual detection levels. This 'legitimacy' effect may help explain why anti-corruption policies …

For our experiment on corruption, we designed a coordination game to model the influence of risk attitudes, beliefs … setting reduces corruption …

. -- Corruption ; game theory ; experiment ; risk attitude ; beliefs …For our experiment on corruption we designed a coordination game to model the influence of risk attitudes, beliefs, and … behavior. The experimental results show that a higher degree of uncertainty in the informational setting reduces corruption …

reduces corruption. -- Corruption ; game theory ; experiment ; risk attitude ; beliefs …For our experiment on corruption, we designed a coordination game to model the influence of risk attitudes, beliefs …

corruption and tax compliance. We explore this through a formal leniency program. In our experiment, we nest collusive corruption …

corruption and tax compliance. We explore this through a formal leniency program. In our experiment, we nest collusive corruption …

For our experiment on corruption, we designed a coordination game to model the influence of risk attitudes, beliefs … setting reduces corruption. …

In a bribery experiment, we test the hypothesis that distributive fairness considerations make relatively well …

We investigate corruption as a social dilemma by means of a bribery game in which a risk of collective sanction of the …' corruptibility but is not sufficient to eliminate the Tragedy of corruption that leads both firms and officials to earn less than in … the absence of corruption. …