Similar Search Results

Mechanism design with aftermarkets : on the impossibility of pure information intermediation

Dworczak, Piotr - 2016

A mediator, with no prior information and no control over the market protocol, attempts to redesign the information structure in the market by running an information intermediation mechanism with transfers that first elicits information from an agent, and then discloses information to another...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011865067

A study in the pragmatics of persuasion : a game theoretical approach

Glazer, Jacob; Rubinstein, Ariel - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 1 (2006) 4, pp. 395-410

A speaker wishes to persuade a listener to take a certain action. The conditions under which the request is justified, from the listener’s point of view, depend on the state of the world, which is known only to the speaker. Each state is characterized by a set of statements from which the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011702810

Information transmission in persuasion models with imperfect verification

Silva, Francisco - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 19 (2024) 3, pp. 1001-1026

I study a persuasion game between a privately informed agent and a decision maker (DM) who can imperfectly verify the statements made by the agent by observing a signal that is correlated with the agent's information. I find that whether or not the DM benefits from communicating with the agent...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014635265

Designing Reputation (Feedback) Mechanisms

Dellarocas, Chrysanthos; Dini, Federico; Spagnolo, Giancarlo - 2006

Online "feedback mechanisms" - also known as "reputation systems" - have been implemented in the most important private e-markets, such as eBay, Yahoo!, Amazon to foster trust and cooperation among trading partners. In this paper we discuss the main issues relevant for the optimal design of such...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014058809

Bayesian Persuasion by an Informed Mechanism Designer

Zhang, Jun; Chen, Yanlin - 2022

We investigate how an informed designer maximizes her objective when facinga player whose payoff depends on both the designer's private information andon an unknown state within the classical quasilinear environment. Thedesigner can disclose arbitrary information about the state via...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013294529

Mechanism design and communication networks

Renou, Ludovic; Tomala, Tristan - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 7 (2012) 3, pp. 489-533

This paper studies a mechanism design model where the players and the designer are nodes in a communication network. We … characterize the communication networks (directed graphs) for which, in any environment (utilities and beliefs), every incentive … implementable on a given communication network, in all environments with either common independent beliefs and private values or a …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011689312

Beliefs, payoffs, information : on the robustness of the BDP property in models with endogenous beliefs

Gizatulina, Alia; Hellwig, Martin - 2012 - First version: December 1, 2008, This version: March 23, 2012

Neeman (2004) and Heifetz and Neeman (2006) have shown that, in auctions with incomplete information about payoffs, full surplus extraction is only possible if agents’ beliefs about other agents are fully informative about their own payoff parameters. They argue that the set of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010230371

How to allocate research (and other) subsidies

Ensthaler, Ludwig; Giebe, Thomas - 2011

A budget-constrained buyer wants to purchase items from a short-listed set. Items are differentiated by observable quality and sellers have private reserve prices for their items. The buyer's problem is to select a subset of maximal quality. Money does not enter the buyer's objective function,...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008936390

Implementation with interdependent valuations

MacLean, Richard P.; Postlewaite, Andrew - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 10 (2015) 3, pp. 923-952

It is well-known that the ability of the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism to implement efficient outcomes for private value choice problems does not extend to interdependent value problems. When an agent's type affects other agents' utilities, it may not be incentive compatible for him to...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011673132

A theory of simplicity in games and mechanism design

Pycia, Marek; Troyan, Peter - 2021

We introduce a general class of simplicity standards that vary the foresight abilities required of agents in extensive-form games. Rather than planning for the entire future of a game, agents are presumed to be able to plan only for those histories they view as simple from their current...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012584083