We consider a methodology for studying how beliefs shape platform competition, based on the notion of a partial focality. The concept of focality is useful for modeling platform competition when the presence of network effects results in multiple equilibria for a certain set of prices. We...

We propose a way to compare the extent of preference misrepresentation between two strategies. We define a preference revelation mechanism to be monotone strategyproof if declaring a “more truthful” preference ordering dominates (with respect to the true preferences) declaring a “less...

In this paper we address the question of learning in a two-sided matching mechanism that utilizes the deferred acceptance algorithm. We consider a repeated matching game where at each period agents observe their match and have the opportunity to revise their strategy (i.e., the preference list...

It is shown that if there is adverse selection on seller’s ability in experience goods market, credible communication can be sustained by reputation motives in spite of the inherent conflict of interests between sellers and buyers. In the absence of “commitment” types, reputation motives...

We study platform markets in which the information about users' preferences is dispersed. First, we show how the dispersion of information introduces idiosyncratic uncertainty about participation decisions and how the latter shapes the elasticity of the demands and the equilibrium prices. We...