The paper presents a model of a software monopolist who benefits from a lagged network externality arising from consumers' feedback through the so-called bug-fixing effect. That is, the software producer is able to correct errors in the software code detected by previous users, improving her...

We consider a heretofore unexplored explanation for why platforms, such as Internet service providers, might impose download limits on content consumers: doing so increases the degree to which those consumers view content providers products as substitutes. This, in turn, intensifies competition...

Each agent in a market needs to supplement his skill with a particular skill of another agent to complete his project. A platform matches the agents and allows members of the same match to share their skills. A match is valuable to an agent if he is matched with any agent who possesses a skill...

We consider a heretofore unexplored explanation for why platforms, such as Internet service providers and mobile-phone networks, offer plans with download limits: through one of two mechanisms, doing so causes the providers of the content consumer purchase to either reduce their prices or...

We consider a heretofore unexplored explanation for why platforms, such as Internet service providers and mobile-phone networks, offer plans with download limits: through one of two mechanisms, doing so causes the providers of the content consumer purchase to either reduce their prices or...

This paper introduces a number of game-theoretic tools to model collusive agreements among firms in vertically differentiated markets. I firstly review some classical literature on collusion between two firms producing goods of exogenous different qualities. I then extend the analysis to a...

We prove that a sufficient condition for the core existence in a n-firm vertically differentiated market is that the qualities of firms' products are equally-spaced along the quality spectrum. This result contributes to see that a fully collusive agreement among firms in such markets is more...

We study the informational role of prices in a stochastic environment. We provide a closed-form solution of the monopoly problem when the price imperfectly signals quality to the uninformed buyers. We then study the effect of noise on output, market price, information flows, and expected...

We study the informational role of prices in a stochastic environment. We provide a closed-form solution of the monopoly problem when the price imperfectly signals quality to the uninformed buyers. We then study the effect of noise on output, market price, information flows, and expected...