allocation rules (first- vs. second-price - auction vs. fair division game). The data analysis of the sealed-bid, private value …

allocation rules (first- vs. second-price - auction vs. fair division game). The data analysis of the sealed-bid, private value …

We conduct an experiment in which we auction the scarce rights to play the Proposer and Responder positions in … fees according to the auction price sequences observed in the auction treatment. With endogenous selection into ultimatum … games via auctions, we find that play converges to a session-specific Nash equilibrium and auction prices emerge which …

, deals with bidders' anticipated regrets from winning and from losing the auction. It exploits the stochastic properties of … the auction format and rationalizes: (i) Nash equilibrium bidding, (ii) (non-)monotone overbidding and (iii) fully cursed …

allocation rules (first vs. second price auction vs. fair division game). The data analysis of the sealed-bid, private value …

question of the value added of letting the sourcing process consist of both an auction and a negotiation stage, theoretically … and in a laboratory experiment. Our theoretical results suggest that in a setting where the buyer and the suppliers have … auction is beneficial to the buyer compared to no communication and ex-ante communication. In a setting where the buyer and …

question of the value added of letting the sourcing process consist of both an auction and a negotiation stage, theoretically … and in a laboratory experiment. Our theoretical results suggest that in a setting where the buyer and the suppliers have … auction is beneficial to the buyer compared to no communication and ex-ante communication. In a setting where the buyer and …

We experimentally examine the collusive properties of two commonly used auctions: the English auction (EN) and the … first-price sealed-bid auction (FPSB). In theory, both tacit and overt collusion are always incentive compatible in EN while … both can be incentive compatible in FPSB if the auction is repeated and bidders are patient enough. We find that the …

’ bid. Equilibrium behavior in the first-price auction is mostly unaffected but there are multiple equilibria in the second …- price auction. Consequently, comparative statics across price rules are equivocal. Experimentally, leaks in the first- price … auction favor second movers but harm first movers and sellers, as theoretically predicted. Low to medium leak probabilities …

overbid more than higher value bidders, and they overbid more frequently in the second price auction than in the ascending … price auction. Overall, the lower value bidder submits bids that exceed value about half the time. These patterns are not …