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Dynamic contracts

Fuchs, William - 2005

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003384484

Delegation, commitment, and the regulatory mandate

Spulber, Daniel F. - In: The journal of law, economics, & organization 8 (1992) 1, pp. 126-154

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001330853

Enforcement and cost-effectiveness of international environmental agreements : the role of side-payments

Schmidt, Carsten - 1997

The paper explores the prospects for international environmental cooperation in a context of limited enforcement, if we allow for side-payments between countries and sequential moves in the implementation of the agreement. The framework of the analysis is a static model of heterogenous countries...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009675764

Enforcement and cost-effectiveness of international environmental agreements : the role of side-payments

Schmidt, Carsten - 1997

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013388235

When Agencies Go Nuclear : A Game Theoretical Approach to the Biggest Sticks in an Agency’s Arsenal

Daniels, Brigham - 2012

wake. Drawing on the Nobel Prize–winning game theory developed by Thomas Schelling, this Article moves beyond the dud … Article is based on game theory, it also provides a wealth of examples that work to illustrate the real-world importance of … the theory to many aspects of the administrative state …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014044836

Corporate Design for Regulability : A Principal-Agent-Supervisor Model

Engel, Christoph - 2005

Corporate actors differ from individuals in one important respect: technically, it may be possible to observe the formation of the corporate will from outside, and to impact on its formation. This feature can be exploited by regulators. One technology is inducing corporate actors to hire an...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014062548