We consider a basic stochastic evolutionary model with rare mutation and a best-reply (or better-reply) selection mechanism. Following Young's papers, we call a state stochastically stable if its long-term relative frequency of occurrence is bounded away from zero as the mutation rate decreases...

We consider a class of stochastic discounted games with increasing preferences. We first prove existence of extremal Stationary Markov Perfect Equilibria (SMPE) in pure strategies, and we characterize those equilibria as unique fixed points of well-chosen operators. We use this characterization...

Local interactions refer to social and economic phenomena where individuals' choices are influenced by the choices of others who are close to them socially or geographically. This represents a fairly accurate picture of human experience. Furthermore, since local interactions imply particular...

We study an equilibrium-based continuous asset pricing problem for the securities market. In the previous work [16], we have shown that a certain price process, which is given by the solution to a forward backward stochastic differential equation of conditional McKean-Vlasov type, asymptotically...

We analyze a class of imitation dynamics with mutations for games with any finite number of actions, and give conditions for the selection of a unique equilibrium as the mutation rate becomes small and the population becomes large. Our results cover the multiple-action extensions of the...

We show that the playing sequence-the order in which players update their actions-is a crucial determinant of whether the best-response dynamic converges to a Nash equilibrium. Specifically, we analyze the probability that the best-response dynamic converges to a pure Nash equilibrium in random...

Through building the statistical structure of game theory, this paper develops a paradigm of rationality and equilibrium to model collective and interactive behaviors for various economic ecologies from a perfect organizing corporation to a complete freedom population such as an anarchy. In...

I consider a class of dynamic Bayesian games in which types evolve stochastically according to a first-order Markov process on a continuous type space. Types are privately informed, but they become public together with actions when payoffs are obtained, resulting in a delayed information...

This paper investigates a multi-periodic channel optimization facing uncertain, price dependent, and dynamic demand. The picture of the market uncertainty is incomplete, and only the price and time-dependent mean and standard deviation are known and may depend on the price history. The actual...

We study a continuous-time problem of optimal public good contribution under uncertainty for an economy with a finite number of agents. Each agent can allocate his wealth between private consumption and repeated but irreversible contributions to increase the stock of some public good. We study...