We generalize the concept of Nash equilibrium to the concept of general Nash equilibrium such that it becomes applicable to more general games. We also generalize the concept of general equilibrium in general equilibrium theory to a more general concept of general equilibrium such that it...

We introduce a new rationality criterion for games, which rules out many equilibria. Our selection principle is based on the argument that since the players know the set of poten-tial equilibria of a game, they will actively select an equilibrium in their own interest. We show the existence and...

There are two independent lines of equilibrium concepts. To unify these two lines, we generalize the concept of Nash equilibrium to the concept of general Nash equilibrium such that it becomes applicable to all games. We also generalize the concept of general equilibrium in general equilibrium...

We intend to solve the uniqueness problem of equilibria for all games. We introduce a new rationality criterion for games, which rules out many equilibria. Our selection principle is based on the argument that since the players know the set of potential equilibria of a game, they will actively...

An organization faces a stream of random events everyday. Whether to set managerial rules or allow managerial discretion is a key issue in organizations. In this paper, we investigate the boundaries between rules and discretion in authority. Using an incomplete contract approach, we...