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For our experiment on corruption we designed a coordination game to model the influence of risk attitudes, beliefs, and information on behavioral choices and determined the equilibria. We observed that the participants' risk attitudes failed to explain their choices between corrupt and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008654377
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For our experiment on corruption, we designed a coordination game to model the influence of risk attitudes, beliefs, and information on behavioral choices and determined the equilibria. We observed that the participants' risk attitudes failed to explain their choices between corrupt and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009567098
For games of simultaneous action selection and network formation, game-theoretic behavior and experimental observations are not in line: While theory typically predicts inefficient outcomes for (anti-)coordination games, experiments show that subjects tend to play efficient (non Nash) strategy...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010252390
For our experiment on corruption, we designed a coordination game to model the influence of risk attitudes, beliefs, and information on behavioral choices and determined the equilibria. We observed that the risk attitude of the participant failed to explain their choices between corrupt and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011051389
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015204276
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008688502
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013443147
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013443188
While experimental research on social dilemmas focuses on the distribution of gains, this paper analyzes social preferences in the case of losses. In this experimental study, participants share a loss in a Nash bargaining game. Instead of monetary losses, we use waiting time as an incentive. We...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013105195