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The family of ideal values for cooperative games

Wang, Wenna; Su, Hao; Brink, René van den; Xu, Genjiu - 2018

In view of the nature of pursuing profit, a selfish coefficient function is employed to describe the degrees of selfishness of players in different coalitions, which is the desired rate of return to the worth of coalitions. This function brings in the concept of individual expected reward to...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011794249

Using Shapley's Asymmetric Power Index to Measure Banks' Contributions to Systemic Risk

Garratt, Rodney - 2012

generalisation of the Shapley value; a concept originating in co-operative game theory. An important feature of this approach is that …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013098830

Supply chain reliability and the role of individual suppliers

Hagspiel, Simeon - 2016

game-theory, we propose a payoff scheme based on marginal contributions that explicitly accounts for the statistical …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011457022

Too big to prevail : the paradox of power in coalition formation

Ke, Changxia; Morath, Florian; Newell, Anthony; Page, Lionel - 2021

In standard coalition games, players try to form a coalition to secure a prize and a coalition agreement specifies how the prize is to be split among its members. However, in practical situations where coalitions are formed, the actual split of the prize often takes place after the coalition...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012550309

Too big to prevail : the paradox of power in coalition formation

Ke, Changxia; Morath, Florian; Newell, Anthony; Page, Lionel - 2021

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012494898

Shapley's Value and Its Axiomatization in Games with Prior Probabilities of Coalition Formation

Kamionko, Vladimir; Marakulin, Valeriy M. - 2020

A new model of TU game is introduced and studied. Here apart from the characteristic function, two additional functions are used: relations between the players and the probability of coalition formation. We suggest and study the sufficient properties of the probability function to transform it...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014102140

The Position Value for Partition Function Form Network Games

van den Nouweland, Anne - 2013

We use the axiomatization of the position value for network situations in van den Nouweland and Slikker (2012) to define a position value for partition function form network situations by generalizing the axioms to the partition function form value function setting as studied in Navarro (2007)...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013081872

Partition Function Form Games With Probabilistic Beliefs

Stamatopoulos, Giorgos - 2019

We revisit games in partition function form, i.e. cooperative games where the payoff of a coalition depends on the partition of the entire set of players. We assume that each coalition computes its worth having probabilistic beliefs over the coalitional behavior of the outsiders, i.e., it...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012899601

A cooperative value for Bayesian games

Kalai, Adam Taumann; Kalai, Ehud - 2010

solution builds upon earlier concepts in game theory. It coincides with the von Neumann minmax value on the class of zero sum … decomposition of every game into cooperative and competitive components, which is easy to compute. -- cooperative game theory ; non …- cooperative game theory ; bargaining ; min-max value …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008665710

Efficient formulas and computational efficiency for glove games

Belau-Garmann, Julia - 2013

A well known and simple game to model markets is the glove game where worth is produced by building matching pairs. For glove games, different concepts, like the Shapley value, the restricted Shapley value or the Owen value, yield different distributions of worth. Moreover, computational effort...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010211890