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Chapter 9 Representative democracy as social choice

Schofield, Norman - In: Handbook of social choice and welfare : volume 1, (pp. 425-455). 2002

Social Choice traditionally employs the preferences of voters or agents as primitives. However, in most situations of constitutional decision-making the beliefs of the members of the electorate determine their secondary preferences or choices. Key choices in US political history, such as the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014023834

Information in elections : do third inflexible candidates always promote truthful behavior?

Andina-Díaz, Ascensión - In: SERIEs : Journal of the Spanish Economic Association 7 (2016) 3, pp. 307-339

We model an election between two Downsian mainstream candidates and a third inflexible politician. There is uncertainty about the state of the world. Candidates receive signals on the state and propose a policy to implement. There are two classes of voters: ideological, who are biased towards...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011537537

Incentives dominate selection : chamber-changing legislators are driven by electoral rules and voter preferences

Portmann, Marco; Stadelmann, David; Eichenberger, Reiner - 2019

The role of electoral incentives vs. selection is ideally analyzed in a setting where the same legislators are selected to decide on policies under different electoral rules and where voter preferences on policies can be precisely measured. This is the first paper to look at such a situation....

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012286323

Laboratory Elections with Endogenous Turnout : Proportional Representation versus Majoritarian Rule

Kartal, Melis - 2014

representation using theory and experiments. Numerous empirical studies have compared turnout across PR and MR. However, the … the size of the minority, but the empirical papers on the topic do not control for it. I also show that, in both theory … theory predicts. I conjecture that, under PR, there is a discouragement effect for the small minority because the PR system …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014148573

Strategic sequential voting

González-Díaz, Julio; Herold, Florian; Domínguez, Diego - 2016 - This version: July 27, 2016

In this paper, we study the potential implications of a novel yet natural voting system: strategic sequential voting. Each voter has one vote and can choose when to cast his vote. After each voting period, the current count of votes is publicized enabling subsequent voters to use this...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011514799

The swing voter's curse in social networks

Buechel, Berno; Mechtenberg, Lydia - 2017

We study private communication in social networks prior to a majority vote on two alternative policies. Some (or all) agents receive a private imperfect signal about which policy is correct. They can, but need not, recommend a policy to their neighbors in the social network prior to the vote. We...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011599298

Winning coalitions in plurality voting democracies

Brink, René van den; Dimitrov, Dinko; Rusinowska, Agnieszka - 2019

We study the issue of assigning weights to players that identify winning coalitions in plurality voting democracies. For this, we consider plurality games which are simple games in partition function form such that in every partition there is at least one winning coalition. Such a game is said...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012057177

Strategy and Fundraising in Sequential Majoritarian Elections

Solomon, Adam - 2018

We study dynamic sequential majoritarian campaigns between two players. The winner of the campaign is whomever wins the majority of individual battles. The resource being expended is determined exogenously to the campaign and has no scrap value. We demonstrate, in a fairly general environment,...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012931232

A dynamic theory of electoral competition

Battaglini, Marco - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 9 (2014) 2, pp. 515-554

We present a dynamic theory of electoral competition to study the determinants of fiscal policy. In each period, two …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011674446

Electoral Maldistricting

Gomberg, Andrei - 2020

We introduce a framework to examine, both theoretically and empirically, electoral maldistricting. Maldistricting is defined as districting in pursuit of a policy at the expense of social welfare. Analysis is performed on the set of implementable (via some district map) legislatures, which are...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012836595