We study a strict version of the notion of equilibrium robustness by Kajii and Morris (1997) that allows for a larger class of incomplete information perturbations of a given complete information game, where with high probability, players believe that their payoffs are close to (but may be...

This paper studies a dynamic adjustment process in a large society of forward-looking agents where payoffs are given by a normal form supermodular game. The stationary states of the dynamics correspond to the Nash equilibria of the stage game. It is shown that if the stage game has a monotone...

This note demonstrates that a symmetric 3x3 supermodular game may fail to have any equilibrium robust to incomplete information. Since the global game solution in symmetric 3x3 supermodular games is known to be independent of the noise structure, this result implies that a noise-independent...

We consider a model of evolution in games in which a revising agent observes the actions of a random number of randomly sampled opponents and then chooses a best response to the distribution of actions in the sample. We provide a condition on the distribution of sample sizes under which an...