Similar Search Results

Fragility of reputation and clustering of risk-taking

Ordoñez, Guillermo - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 8 (2013) 3, pp. 653-700

Reputation concerns in credit markets restrain borrowers' temptations to take excessive risk. The strength of these …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011685308

Fragility of reputation and clustering of risk-taking

Ordoñez, Guillermo - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; journal of the Econometric … 8 (2013) 3, pp. 653-700

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010207660

Reputation Concerns in Risky Experimentation

Chen, Chia‐Hui - 2019

We develop a general model, with the exponential bandit as a special case, in which high-ability agents are more likely to achieve early success but also learn faster that their project is not promising. These counteracting effects give rise to a signaling model in which the single-crossing...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012866872

Strategies under Strategic Uncertainty

Mass, Helene - 2019

I investigate the decision problem of a player in a game of incomplete information who faces uncertainty about the other players' strategies. I propose a new decision criterion which works in two steps. First, I assume common knowledge of rationality and eliminate all strategies which are not...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012895797

Strategies under strategic uncertainty

Mass, Helene - 2018

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011946016

Trust and reputation under asymmetric information

Janas, Moritz; Oljemark, Emilia - 2020 - Version: September 10, 2020

information about the multiplier. We discuss potential reasons for the deviation between theory and experimental data. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012422494

Seller Reputation and Trust in Pre-Trade Communication

Jullien, Bruno; Park, In-Uck - 2009

can be sustained by reputation motives in spite of the inherent conflict of interests between sellers and buyers. In the … absence of “commitment” types, reputation motives are explained as a consequence of equilibrium interplay between the market …, reputation motives do not disappear even after the seller’s ability is revealed. This model is applied to examine the extent to …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014203351

Optimal delegation of sequential decisions : the role of communication and reputation

Atakan, Alp; Koçkesen, Levent; Kubilay, Elif - 2017

gradually builds up her reputation. Principal provides full information in every period as long as he has always observed his …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011609923

Trust and betrayals: reputational payoffs and behaviors without commitment

Pei, Harry - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 16 (2021) 2, pp. 449-475

I study a repeated game in which a patient player wants to win the trust of some myopic opponents but can strictly benefit from betraying them. His benefit from betrayal is strictly positive and is his persistent private information. I characterize every type of patient player's highest...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012587361

Reputation building with endogenous speed of learning

Pei, Harry - 2019

I study reputation models in which information about the long-run player's past behavior is dispersed among short …-run players. I identify two challenges to reputation building when such information is aggregated via the short-run players …-run player's current period action, I propose a resistent to learning condition under which reputation fails. This is because the …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012169393