Showing 1 - 10 of 14,880
Reputation concerns in credit markets restrain borrowers' temptations to take excessive risk. The strength of these …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011685308
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010207660
We develop a general model, with the exponential bandit as a special case, in which high-ability agents are more likely to achieve early success but also learn faster that their project is not promising. These counteracting effects give rise to a signaling model in which the single-crossing...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012866872
I investigate the decision problem of a player in a game of incomplete information who faces uncertainty about the other players' strategies. I propose a new decision criterion which works in two steps. First, I assume common knowledge of rationality and eliminate all strategies which are not...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012895797
I investigate the decision problem of a player in a game of incomplete information who faces uncertainty about the other players' strategies. I propose a new decision criterion which works in two steps. First, I assume common knowledge of rationality and eliminate all strategies which are not...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011946016
information about the multiplier. We discuss potential reasons for the deviation between theory and experimental data. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012422494
can be sustained by reputation motives in spite of the inherent conflict of interests between sellers and buyers. In the … absence of “commitment” types, reputation motives are explained as a consequence of equilibrium interplay between the market …, reputation motives do not disappear even after the seller’s ability is revealed. This model is applied to examine the extent to …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014203351
gradually builds up her reputation. Principal provides full information in every period as long as he has always observed his …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011609923
I study a repeated game in which a patient player wants to win the trust of some myopic opponents but can strictly benefit from betraying them. His benefit from betrayal is strictly positive and is his persistent private information. I characterize every type of patient player's highest...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012587361
I study reputation models in which information about the long-run player's past behavior is dispersed among short …-run players. I identify two challenges to reputation building when such information is aggregated via the short-run players …-run player's current period action, I propose a resistent to learning condition under which reputation fails. This is because the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012169393