can be tricky, this paper uses the crime strategic model (inspection game) proposed by Tsebelis. This model shows that any … attempts to increase the severity of punishment will alter the payoff of the individuals involved, leaving unchanged the … frequency of violation at equilibrium. This result is misleading: payoffs are not independent and the crime game can not be …

of fines on punishment and deterrence. Partial effects are effects on potential violators' and punishers' decisions when … hypotheses derived from the theory. …

) there is preference uncertainty. In a linear public good with punishment meted out by a disinterested participant, I test … two implications of the model: (a) participants increase contributions in reaction to imperfect punishment; (b) imperfect … punishment helps sustain cooperation if participants experience free-riding …

amount of punishment in the first instance and on the underlying incidence of “crime”. This is the question, we address in … this paper, namely to ask, whether and how punishment decisions – and underlying decisions of committing a crime – change …This paper analyses, by means of an economic experiment, the impact of (judicial) review on third party punishment …

) there is preference uncertainty. In a linear public good with punishment meted out by a disinterested participant, I test … two implications of the model: (a) participants increase contributions in reaction to imperfect punishment; (b) imperfect … punishment helps sustain cooperation if participants experience free-riding. -- deterrence ; public good experiment ; inequity …

In a high-crime environment with many high-income citizens, private security companies which offer protection against … crime can flourish. In this article crime is modelled as a game where richer victims yield a higher return on crime, but … with decreasing returns to crime as more criminals choose crime to supplement their income. Private security providers …