Competition enforcement is characterised by asymmetric information and Competition Authorities have been provided with inspection powers to reduce the informative gap. The paper looks at competition inspections from different perspectives. First of all, the paper analyses convergences of...

This paper was prepared as background for a discussion held at the OECD in June 2015 on oligopoly markets. It focuses on collusion and conduct facilitating collusion in oligopolies. It provides a brief introduction to the notion of agreement, covers merger control and the analysis of the...

We analyze how leniency affects cartel pricing in an infinitely-repeated oligopoly model where the fine rates are linked to illegal gains and detection probabilities depend on the degree of collusion. A novel aspect of this study is that we focus on the worst possible outcome. We investigate the...

We analyze maximal cartel prices in infinitely-repeated oligopoly models under leniency where fines are linked to illegal gains, as often outlined in existing antitrust regulation, and detection probabilities depend on the degree of collusion. We introduce cartel culture that describes how...

The past and current reluctance of firms and individuals to use private enforcement suggests that there are limited incentives for self-help. The key contribution of private enforcement to overall deterrence derives from cases which would not otherwise be brought, not simply because of resource...