Showing 1 - 10 of 10,859
knowledge. We test this result in a laboratory experiment. The data cannot confirm the predicted welfare dominance of private …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012422494
Information sharing has become increasingly important in helping consumers make better, more informed choices over competing products. Our project uses a novel theoretical framework and laboratory experiments to analyze three simple, commonly used incentive schemes against an unincentivized...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011288789
Information sharing has become increasingly important in helping consumers make better, more informed choices over competing products. Our project uses a novel theoretical framework and laboratory experiments to analyze three simple, commonly used incentive schemes against an unincentivized...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013019406
, low-level officials, and the judiciary are corrupt. In the model, the central government sells offices to low …-level officials and demands ex-post payments enforced by the judiciary. Because an independent judiciary can rule against the central … promotes corruption at the lower level. Therefore, even if highly corrupt, an independent judiciary may reduce total corruption …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013317025
The issue of the stability and change of legal rules occupies a central place in the discussions of alternative ways of organizing justice and the provision of legal rules. There nonetheless remains a theoretical aspect that has never been raised in the literature on judicial decision making and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013098944
It is argued in literature that transparency may be detrimental to welfare. Morris and Shin (2002) suggest reducing the precision of public information or withholding it. The latter seems to be unrealistic. Thus, the issue is not whether central bank should disclose or not its information, but...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011526649
We examine multistage information transmission with voluntary monetary transfer in the framework of Crawford and Sobel (1982). In our model, an informed expert can send messages to an uninformed decision maker more than once, and the uninformed decision maker can pay money to the informed expert...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011671657
I study reputation models in which information about the long-run player's past behavior is dispersed among short-run players. I identify two challenges to reputation building when such information is aggregated via the short-run players' actions. First, when the long-run player's action can...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012169393
We discuss (dis)incentives for fair cooperation related to delegating macroprudential policy decisions to a supranational body, as well as their welfare implications. The question is studied by means of a signaling game of imperfect information between two national regulators. The model...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009613279
This paper deals with the effects of different modes of communication in a costless information transmission environment with multiple senders. To this aim, we present a theoretical and experimental study of three Cheap Talk games, each having two senders and one receiver. The communication of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012431852