We establish the existence and uniqueness of pure-strategy equilibrium in two-worker rank order contests with sabotage while allowing interdependent effects of productive and sabotage effort. We find that diverging marginal costs in workers' productive effort discourage sabotage activity. For...

In this paper, I study the dynamic delegation problem in a principal–agent model wherein an agent privately observes a persistently evolving state, and the principal commits to actions based on the agent's reported state. There are no transfers. While the agent has state-independent...

As a new revenue source for game companies, location sponsorship in location-based augmented reality (LBAR) gaming has become increasingly important in helping brick-and-mortar stores generate foot traffic. In this paper, through the lens of a game-theoretic model, we investigate how competing...

A revision game of experimentation is examined in which players search for an unknown threshold. Players encounter individual random opportunities to revise actions. Lower actions save flow cost, but the player whose action falls below the threshold suffers a costly breakdown and exits the game....