Before a group can take a decision, its members must agree on a mechanism to aggregate individual preferences. In this … paper we present the results of an experiment on the influence of private payoff information and the role of the available …

We report the results of a combination of a dictator experiment with either a “social planner” or a “veil of ignorance …” experiment. The experimental design and the analysis of the data are based on the theoretical framework proposed in the companion … experiments by a combination of selfishness and concerns for distributive justice. Most participants conform very well with the …

recover individual notions of distributive justice from data collected in appropriately designed experiments. “Dictator games … planner” experiments or experiments under a “veil of ignorance” (Rawls 1971) can be used to recover larger parts of the notion … necessarily incentivecompatible, and to recover a greater part of an individual’s preference relation in dictator experiments than …

We report the results of a combination of a dictator experiment with either a "social planner" or a "veil of ignorance …" experiment. The experimental design and the analysis of the data are based on the theoretical framework proposed in the companion … experiments by a combination of selfishness and concerns for distributive justice. Most participants conform very well with the …

recover individual notions of distributive justice from data collected in appropriately designed experiments. "Dictator games … planner" experiments or experiments under a "veil of ignorance" (Rawls 1971) can be used to recover larger parts of the notion … necessarily incentive-compatible, and to recover a greater part of an individual's preference relation in dictator experiments …

order to disentangle different choice dynamics, they devise a laboratory experiment with a novel experimental task in which …

Economists have been theorizing that other-regarding preferences influence decision making. Yet, what are the …

Previous research on public-good games revealed greater contributions by fast decision-makers than by slow decision … location of the equilibrium determines whether contributions are larger for fast decision-makers than for slow decision …-makers. Replicating previous results, we find that fast decision-makers give more than slow decision-makers when the equilibrium is below …

In prosocial decisions, decision-makers are inherently uncertain about how their decisions impact others’ utility – we …