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Despite linear programming and duality have correctly been incorporated in algorithms to compute the nucleolus, we have found mistakes in how these have been used in a broad range of applications. Overlooking the fact that a linear program can have multiple optimal solutions and neglecting the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014037353
In this paper we show how theorems of Borsuk-Ulam and Tucker can be used to construct a consensus-halving: a division of an object into two portions so that each of n people believe the portions are equally split. Moreover, the division takes at most n cuts, which is best possible. This extends...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011569033
We consider the n-player houseswapping game of Shapley-Scarf (1974), with indfferences in preferences allowed. It is well-known that the strict core of such a game may be empty, single-valued, or multi-valued. We define a condition on such games called "segmentability", which means that the set...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014084462
Many economic and social situations can be represented by a digraph. Both axiomatic and iterativemethods to determine the strength or power of all the nodes in a digraph have been proposed inthe literature. We propose a new method, where the power of a node is determined by both thenumber of its...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011318587
theory. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011335203
lattice theory, we revisit the interchangeability and monotone properties of Nash equilibria in two-person games. We show that …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013220760
Around 1947, von Neumann showed that for any finite two-person zero-sum game, there is a feasible linear programming (LP) problem consisting of a primal-dual pair of linear programs whose saddle points yield equilibria of the game, thus providing an immediate proof of the minimax theorem from...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013226681
In this note we reconsider Nash equilibria for the linear quadratic differential game for an infinite planning horizon. We consider an open-loop information structure. In the standard literature this problem is solved under the assumption that every player can stabilize the system on his own. In...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013104566
-Tucker theory. In particular, with respect to the economic interpretation of the primal and dual problems, it established the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013061491
In this note we show without using any fixed-point theorem argument, that a pair of vectors is an equilibrium point of a bimatrix game if it solves a certain bilinear programming problem. Since the bilinear programming problem we consider has an optimal solution, we are able to prove the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013215324