In this paper we characterize the feedback equilibrium of a general infinite-horizon Stackelberg-Nash differential game where the roles of the players are mixed. By mixed we mean that one player is a leader on some decisions and a follower on other decisions. We prove a verification theorem that...

We study a two-period supply chain in which a manufacturer produces a product, learns to reduce cost, and sells it through a retailer with a price-dependent demand. The manufacturer's second-period production cost declines linearly in the first-period production with a random learning rate. The...

Dynamic Stackelberg game models have been used to study sequential decision making in noncooperative games in various fields. In this paper we give relevant dynamic Stackelberg game models, and review their applications to operations management and marketing channels. A common feature of these...

A nearly explicit feedback Stackelberg-Nash equilibrium is obtained in a dynamic distribution channel consisting of a manufacturer and two competing asymmetric retailers engaged in promoting the manufacturer's product to be sold through the retailers. The manufacturer decides on its support for...

This study investigates the strategic effect of return policies in a dual-channel supply chain, in which a manufacturer can sell products directly to end customers and indirectly via an independent retailer. The manufacturer decides whether to implement a return policy in either the direct or...

In this paper, we analyze a variant of the standard Hotelling model of spatial competition where firms first choose locations along the line and then, given these locations, compete in prices. Consumers have a finite reservation price and incur a quadratic transportation cost. We show that there...

We present a sufficient condition for a feedback Stackelberg equilibrium of a stochastic differential game on an infinite horizon. This condition gives rise to a system of elliptic partial differential equations involving a static Stackelberg game at the level of Lagrangian. As an example, we...

Firms' quality commitment can efficiently improve the demand. This paper addresses the quality commitment under the duopoly. By establishing a Cournot model, the effects of quality commitment are discussed. Firstly, under one-sided quality commitment, the higher efficiency firm committing in...

This paper investigates a contest in information revelation between firms that seek to persuade consumers by revealing positive own information and negative information about the rival. In the face of limited bandwidth, firms are forced to make a trade-off between disclosing their own positive...

Decoy ballots do not count in election outcomes, but otherwise they are indistinguishable from real ballots. By means of a game-theoretical model, we show that decoy ballots may not provide effective protection against a malevolent adversary trying to buy real ballots. If the citizenry is...