We investigate whether peer punishment is an efficient mechanism for enforcing cooperation in an experiment with a long … time horizon. Previous evidence suggests that the costs of peer punishment can be outweighed by the benefits of higher … cooperation, if (i ) there is a sufficiently long time horizon and (ii ) punishment cannot be avenged. However, in most instances …

punishment opportunities. One important challenge for the mechanism is imperfect information about cooperative behavior. It has … been shown that imperfect information increases misdirected punishment and thereby hampers the efficacy of the punishment … subjects choose to monitor either perfectly or not at all. Little punishment takes place with imperfect information. The large …

subjects to punish free-riders increases cooperation in the public goods game, and that the degree of punishment is sensitive … cadets' reluctance or willingness to punish non-cooperators in a public goods experiment. We employ a standard public goods … game with punishment, but in addition to knowing how much each player contributed to the group good, subjects also know the …

We investigate whether peer punishment is an efficient mechanism for enforcing cooperation in an experiment with a long … time horizon. Previous evidence suggests that the costs of peer punishment can be outweighed by the benefits of higher … cooperation, if (i) there is a sufficiently long time horizon and (ii) punishment cannot be avenged. However, in most instances in …

This paper studies how the existence of counter-punishment opportunities affects cooperation and welfare when agents … face a social dilemma. Using a public-good game we find that under the threat of counter-punishment cooperators are less … willing to punish free-riders. As a result, under both fixed and random matching, the fear of counter-punishment to a large …

levels when agents face a social dilemma. Using a public good experiment, I show that in the presence of counter-punishment …

This paper investigates how punishment promotes cooperation when the punishment enforcer is independent of its proposer …. In a prisoner's dilemma experiment, compared with the case when the implicated parties are allowed to punish each other …, cooperation is lower when the enforcement of punishment requires approval from an independent third party. Our data show that the …

¤ects individuals' willingness to engage in altruistic punishment in a public good experiment in which the number of stages is …Altruistic punishment may promote cooperation, but can also lead to costly feuds. We examine how the threat of feuds a … determined by participants' actions. The design allows participants to use a range of punishment strategies. We nd that …

in biology and the social sciences. Recent experimental evidence suggests that altruistic punishment is an important … mechanism to maintain cooperation among humans. In this paper we explore the boundary conditions for altruistic punishment to … maintain cooperation by systematically varying the cost and impact of punishment, using a subject pool which extends beyond the …

backfires as special agents extract significantly more resources. Introducing a peer punishment mechanism sustains contributions … stigmatization effect for the special agent as he receives substantially more peer punishment while contributions by other agents do … not change. Finally full transparency of all agents actions creates full accountability as it allows targeted punishment …