sanction scheme capable both of resolving and of exacerbating the free-rider problem, depending on parameter settings. Most …

This paper studies monitoring and punishment behavior by second and third parties in a cooperation experiment with … stage, but can decide to resolve the information imperfection at non-negative cost at the punishment stage. We examine how … monitoring and punishment respond to changes in monitoring costs, and exploit the evidence to gain new insights about …

of punishment. This paper presents the first controlled experiment to study a third important factor that has been mainly …Economic theory suggests that the deterrence of deviant behavior is driven by a combination of severity and certainty … will be punished is dissolved and the timing at which the punishment is actually imposed, as well as the combination …

treatments, subjects play the public goods game with the possibility to sanction others. In the STANDARD sanctions treatment … treatment, sanctions are announced only after the experiment is finished, removing in this way all strategic reasons to punish … (altruistic punishment). Interestingly, contributions to the public good in both treatments with sanctioning are higher than when …

An effective way to foster cooperation is to monitor behaviour and sanction freeriding. Yet, previous studies have … communication of trust maintains cooperation upon the removal of centralized (Study 1), thirdparty (Study 2), and peer punishment …

positive probabilities of shirking/inspecting. We examine the effects of allowing the employer to sanction or reward the …

By means of a laboratory experiment, we study the impact of the endogenous adoption of a collective punishment …-voting. In line with the theory, we find that the exogenous introduction of the punishment mechanism significantly increases … mechanism within a one-shot binary trust game. The experiment comprises three games. In the first one, the only equilibrium …

the employer does not inspect. We examine the effects of allowing the employer discretion to sanction or reward the … earnings. When employers have discretion to reward and/or sanction independently of whether they inspect we find that rewards …

) there is preference uncertainty. In a linear public good with punishment meted out by a disinterested participant, I test … two implications of the model: (a) participants increase contributions in reaction to imperfect punishment; (b) imperfect … punishment helps sustain cooperation if participants experience free-riding …

punishment helps sustain cooperation if participants experience free-riding. -- deterrence ; public good experiment ; inequity …) there is preference uncertainty. In a linear public good with punishment meted out by a disinterested participant, I test … two implications of the model: (a) participants increase contributions in reaction to imperfect punishment; (b) imperfect …