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We study hedonic games with heterogeneous player types that reflect her nationality, ethnic background, or skill type. Agents' preferences are dictated by status-seeking where status can be either local or global. The two dimensions of status define the two components of a generalized constant...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014189207
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001788909
We first show through a counter-example that the existence result of Maskin: Bargaining, coalitions and externalities, Presidential address of the Econometric Society, 2003] does not extend beyond three players.Intuitively, the bargaining may not be able to continue because there may be no...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014176923
We adopt the largest consistent set defined by Chwe [J. of Econ. Theory 63 (1994), 299-235] to predict which coalition …, based on the assumption that players are cautious. For games with positive spillovers, many coalition structures may belong … to the largest consistent set. The grand coalition, which is the efficient coalition structure, always belongs to the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014076140
increasing as a coalition adds to its members. The new feature in the mechanism is that the proposer has a choice to implement …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012963352
This chapter surveys recent models of coalition and network formation in a unified framework. Comparisons are drawn … among various procedures of network and coalition formation, involving simultaneous and sequential moves. The survey also … discussion of efficient network and coalition formation procedures and directions for future research. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014025687
We study assignment problems with externalities where agents have expectations about the reactions of other agents to group deviations. We present notions of core consistent with such expectations and identify the largest and smallest cores. We restrict the domain of preferences to study the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014358116
of steps. We use elementary tools of graph theory and a representation theorem obtained here. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010350435
modifications: first, payoff division can only be agreed upon after the coalition has formed (two-stage bargaining); second …, negotiations in the coalition can break down, in which case a new coalition may be formed (reversible coalitions). Under the most … propoper advantage and a linear relationship between weights and ex post payoffs for all coalition members other than the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003675312
This paper studies a noncooperative allocation procedure for coalitional games with veto players. The procedure is similar to the one presented by Dagan et al. (1997) for bankruptcy problems. According to it, a player, the proposer, makes a proposal that the remaining players must accept or...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009578191