value of a coalition-based on the best or worst roommate in the coalition. In all cases, we determine the complexity of …

countries is self-enforcing. It is shown that there always exists a rather small stable tax coalition. For some subset of the … parameter space the grand coalition may be stable as well, even if the total number of countries is large. The small stable … coalition is not very effective in mitigating the inefficiency of the non-cooperative Nash equilibrium. The ineffectiveness is …

of countries is self-enforcing. It is shown that there always exists a rather small stable tax coalition. For some subset … of the parameter space the grand coalition may be stable as well, even if the total number of countries is large. The … small stable coalition is not very effec- tive in mitigating the inefficiency of the non-cooperative Nash equilibrium. The …

produce for the endogenous formation of an international counterterror coalition. We show that there are quite reasonable … counterterror coalition, holding the choices of all other nations as given. The incentives to join the coalition are the group …-specific benefits from retaliation enjoyed by each coalition member, the relatively lower spillover benefit from retaliation enjoyed by …